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Abstract: A mixed imitational minority game is proposedˊResults show that system’s variance 
presents non-monotonous trend with increasing number N0 of imitational agent for small memory 
size m; while it increases with increasing N0 for large mˈwhich indicates an obvious inhibition 
effect on system’s forecast ability. 
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ĉ. Introduction 
The study of agent-based models of complex adaptive system model is attracting much 
interest these years. Among the many possible interdisciplinary applications is the growing field 
of econophysics. 
Challet and Zhang 
[1,2]
 introduced a simple and useful minority game model (MG) based on 
Arthur’s bar problem 
[3]
 in 1997, which is believed to capture some essential and general features 
regarding competition among adaptive agents. 
The set-up of the MG is as follows. N (an odd number) agents must repeatedly choose one 
side from a choice of two at each time step and those who happen to be on the minority side win, 
and are rewarded one score while the agents on the majority side lose and get nothing. To make a 
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 decision, each agent uses his best strategy among his s strategies picked randomly from a pool 
of
possible strategies at the beginning of the game, with repetitions being allowed. A strategy is a 
look-up table which returns a prediction of which side will be the minority side referring to a 
given input. The input is the list of m zeros and ones that denote what the minority sides were for 
the last m time steps. After each turn, each agent assigns one virtual score to each of his 
strategies which would have predicted the correct winning side. The best strategy is the one with 
the most virtual scores among his s strategies. Any ties between strategies are decided by the toss 
of a coin. 
R.Savit et al 
[4]
 studied the conditional probability for different m and found that there was 
some useful information which could predict minority side for given history. But only when m
was larger the information could be utilized by agents, which improved agents’ average 
performance. As m increasing further, it was hard for agents to catch the information from history. 
A lot of works with imitation 
[5, 6]
 have been done by many researchers based on MG. For 
example, Slanina studied imitational minority game on one dimensional periodic chain, where 
agent could imitate his left-hand neighbor when making decision 
[5, 7]
. Quan et al studied mixed 
population minority game with imitation 
[6]
. But the study of two directional imitational minority 
game with mixed agents has not been reported yet. 
In this paper, we proposed two directional imitational minority game with mixed agents. In the 
model, there are two kinds of agents, some agents can imitate their nearest neighbors’ behaviors, 
while others make their decisions by using their own strategies according to the basic rule of 
MG . 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section Ċ, we define our model incorporating the 
effects of information transmission into mixed MG. Numerical results and discussions are 
presented in Section ċ. Results are summarized in Section Č.
.Ċ The Model 
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Agents are put in a circle and divided into two groups. N0˄ ˅agents can transmit 
information with their left-hand and right-hand neighbors. When the agent finds his scores 
smaller than that of his best neighbor, he will use the decision of his best neighbor in last step as 
his choice; otherwise, he uses his own strategies to make his decision. The best neighbor at the 
time step t is the one with the highest scores. When two neighbors’ scores are equal at the same 
time, one of them is randomly chosen to be the best one (we suppose that the imitation is free). 
Other NˉN0 agents don’t imitate and they just use their best strategies when making decision.
The model corresponds to the MG when N0=0 and all agents can imitate when N0=N.
00 N N≤ ≤
. Numerical Simulation and Discussionċ
We consider a system with N=101. The standard deviation is defined as 
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where  is the number of agents choosing to side A in ith time step. iA A  is the average numbers 
of agents to side A, n is the total number of time steps. For random choice game, 2 0.25
N
σ
=
.
We first plot the reduced variance  as a function of N0 for different m with s=3 in Fig 1. 
Each data point corresponds to an average over 64 independent runs. In each run, the reduced 
variance is obtained in a window of 10
5
 time steps after allowing the system to reach its steady 
state in the first 10
6
 time steps. From the figure, we see that the variances show different trend. 
For small m, it gives non-monotonous trend with increasing N0, the variance decreases first and 
reaches its minimum at some certain value of N0 (for m=3, N0=90) and then increases. While for 
large m the variance shows monotonous ascending trend with increasing N0 and it increases more 
quickly after some value of N0, which indicates an obvious inhibition effect on system’s forecast 
ability for larger m.
2 / Nσ
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Fig.1 The reduced variance  vs. N0 for different m with N=101 and s=3 2 / Nσ
In order to study the effect of imitation further, we calculate the average success rate of agents. 
The average success rate of agents is defined as follows: 
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Si,, Wi are average success rate and scores of ith agent at t step. 
Fig 2 represents the average success rate S  of the system with s=3 as a function of N0 for 
m=3ǃ7. 3S  and 7S  are average success rate for system with m=3 and 7, while 31S (or 32S ) and 
71S (or 72S )  are average success rate for agents who can (or can’t) imitate. From the figure, we 
see that 31S  and 32S  show different trend, 31S  first increases mildly then decreases while 32S  is 
monotonous increased with increasing N0. For small N0, 31S  is larger than 32S , but the reverse is 
true for larger N0. It means that when N0 is small, the agents who imitate can perform better than 
others, as N0 increased, more and more agents imitate, the agents who imitate perform worse 
than others due to the crowd effect. The average success rate 3S  shows positive (or negative) 
imitation effect with increasing N0 when N0 is smaller (or larger) than 90 which results in a non-
monotonous trend of the reduced variance for system with m=3. On the other hand, with 
increasing N0, 71S  (or 72S ) shows similar trend as that of 31S (or 32S ), but 71S  is smaller than 
72S  all the time, which means that imitation is harmful to the agents who imitate for a system 
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with larger m.
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Fig.2 The relationship between average success rate S  and N0 for N=101, m=3ǃ7 and s=3
We could explain the above results as follows. In original MG, there are few strategies for 
small m, and many agents have the same best strategies at given step, which causes too many 
agents to choose to the same side and leads to large variance. However, when imitation is 
introduced, an agent makes his decision not always based on his best strategy but may imitate his 
neighbors’ last choice, which decreases the crowd effect for small m and results in a reduction of 
the system’s variance. With increasing N0, more and more agents will imitate their neighbors’ last 
choice, which causes some agents to have the same choice and leads to another crowd effect, so
the system variance becomes larger. When m is large, the introduction of imitation inhibits some 
agents’ forecast ability, which results in a larger system’s variance. Meanwhile, the other crowd 
effect mentioned above leads to the accelerating increasing trend when N0 is big enough.
.Č Summary 
In conclusion, we have discussed a mixed two directional imitational minority game in one 
dimensional periodic chainˊResults show that system’s variance presents non-monotonous 
trend with increasing N0 for small memory size m, while it increases with increasing N0 for large 
mˈwhich indicates an obvious inhibition effect on system’s forecast ability. 
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